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REPLY TO BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Defendant/Appellant makes reply to the Brief of 
Respondent herein and inasmuch as each of the parties hereto has 
included a statement of facts in their briefs, it is unnecessary 
to repeat them here. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The highway patrolman had no articulable suspicion at 
the time of the stop that defendant Wells was driving a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol to a degree that 
rendered him incapable of safely driving the motor vehicle. He 
stopped him only as a courtesy because the right rear door of the 
motor home of defendant swung open when a left turn was made by 
the defendant. Trooper Ball, the highway patrolman, observed the 
driving pattern of the defendant for some distance and testified 
that there was nothing about the manner in which defendant drove 
the motor vehicle to indicate that defendant was under the 
influence of intoxicants at the time to a degree which rendered 
him incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff argues that the officer had a "reasonable 
articulable suspicion" for stopping defendant's motor home and 
cites in support thereof an alleged violation of §41-6-108.10 and 
41-6-66, U.C.A. and, therefore, had committed a crime, the 
penalty for which was found in §41-6-12. 
Neither statute is applicable to the facts of the 
instant case. §41-6-108.10, entitled "Vehicle Door Prohibited 
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Opening" states: 
"Mo person shall open the door of a vehicle 
on a side available to moving traffic.,." 
There is no evidence, nor insinuation, that defendant 
"opened the door" of the vehicle. The statute goes on to say 
"nor shall any person leave the door open on a side of the 
vehicle available to moving traffic..." 
Plaintiff has not furnished us with the answer to the 
logical question of "How could defendant have committed the crime 
of leaving the vehicle door open if he did not open it nor know 
it was open." (emphasis added) Clearly the cited statutes were 
not meant to apply to the instant situation, nor did the officer 
consider the right rear door that swung open only when defendant 
made a left turn a violation of the law because he did not cite 
defendant with violating the cited statutes. 
§41-6-108.10 was meant to apply to a situation where a 
motor vehicle stopped in the words of the statute "to load or 
unload passengers". 
§41-6-66 entitled Turning Manner, etc. states that "a 
left turn shall be made by turning onto the roadway being entered 
in the extreme left hand lane for the traffic moving in the same 
direction." 
In regards to the left hand turn from Wall Avenue onto 
20th Street, the evidence was as follows: (transcript, page 9) 
Q Alright, was there anything unusual about the 
driving, other than the door swinging and - - . 
A The only other thing was that it made an improper 
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turn from Wall Avenue onto 20th Street. The law states that you 
should turn from the left most lane into the left most lane and 
he made a wide turn into the right lane. 
Q Okay, that wasn't the reason for stopping him. 
A That was not. (emphasis added) 
Once again, obviously, the alleged violation of §41-6-
66 was not the reason for stopping the defendant. 
The recent case of State v. Richard C. Baird, a Utah 
Court of Appeals decision, found in 94 Utah Advanced Reports, 40 
at page 41, citing State v. Deitman, 739 P2d 616 (Utah, 1987), 
informs us that "(2) An officer may seize a person if an officer 
has an "articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or 
is about to commit a crime;" 
Clearly, the reason for the stop in the instant case 
was merely a courtesy stop as the officer has testified to and 
was not "an articulable suspicion that a person has committed or 
is about to commit a crime", (transcript, page 31) 
Plaintiff cites two Utah cases in support of its 
argument that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
conviction. These cases are cited for the position that, where 
there was no driving pattern prior to the stop observed by the 
arresting officer, that the evidence was, nevertheless, 
sufficient to support the conviction of driving under the 
influence. The cases cited are Layton City v. Noon, 736 P2d, 
1035 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1987) and Layton City v. Bennett, 
731 P2d 965 (Utah Court of Appeals 1987). 
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Both cases are easily distinguishable from the case at 
bar. 
In the Noon case, two issues, only, were raised on 
appeal. Noon's first contention on appeal was that the officer 
did not have probable cause to arrest him for driving under the 
influence (page 1037). Noon's second contention on appeal (page 
1038) was that he was denied a fair trial because of the 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
Nowhere in the cited case was the issue raised that the 
evidence based on a driving pattern was insufficient to support 
defendant's conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol. 
That issue was simply not the reason for the appeal nor was it 
discussed. The most that the Noon case can stand for in the 
absence of observation of a driving pattern by the officer is 
that even though officer Robnett did not see the defendant drive 
the motor vehicle, he had probable cause for the arrest. At page 
1038, the Court states: 
"The mere fact that Robnett had not seen Noon 
actually driving the car is not fatal to the 
existence of probable cause", (emphasis 
added) 
That holding cannot be construed to pertain to anything 
other than the arrest and cannot be converted into a finding of 
sufficient evidence to support Noon's conviction based upon the 
nonobservance of a driving pattern. Noon never contested the 
latter issue and the Court made no findings on it. 
In Layton City v. Bennett, (supra) on page 967, the 
Court states: 
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"A c o m p l e t e s t a t e m e n t of t h e f a c t s i s 
u n n e c e s s a r y . B r i e f l y s t a t e d , a p o l i c e 
o f f i ce r observed defendant d r iv ing h i s t ruck 
in to a c o n s t r u c t i o n s i t e a t 1:00 a .m. and 
followed in behind him." 
Once aga in , p l a i n t i f f has m i s i n t e r p r e t e d the purpose of 
the appea l . On page 967 of Bennet t , i s c l e a r l y s t a t e d the reason 
for the appea l : 
"On a p p e a l , d e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t (1) the 
a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r v i o l a t e d t he d e f e n d a n t ' s 
four th amendment r i g h t by ' i n t e r r o g a t i n g ' him 
without a ' r e a sonab l e s u s p i c i o n ' (2) t h a t the 
t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d have d i s m i s s e d two 
p o t e n t i a l j u r o r s for cause , and (3) the t r i a l 
C o u r t i m p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d ' i n t o x i l y z e r 
main tenance a f f i d a v i t s ' . We r e j e c t t h e s e 
claims and aff i rm de fendan t ' s c o n v i c t i o n " . 
Nowhere was i t contended t h a t t he o f f i c e r had not 
o b s e r v e d t h e d r i v i n g p a t t e r n a n d , t h e r e f o r e , t h e r e was 
i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence upon which to base a c o n v i c t i o n . Because 
of the "br ief" s ta tement of f ac t provided by the Court , we a re 
deprived of what the o f f i c e r t e s t i f i e d to in regard to d r i v i n g 
p a t t e r n . Apparently the defendant concluded t h a t t h i s was not an 
arguable i s sue because he did not r a i s e i t . 
P l a i n t i f f , next on page nine of i t s b r i e f , makes the 
amazing s t a t emen t , "Trooper Bal l never r e a l l y had an oppor tuni ty 
t o o b s e r v e d e f e n d a n t ' s d r i v i n g " and g i v e s as a s u p p o r t i n g 
re fe rence page 31 of the t r a n s c r i p t . A reading of the t r a n s c r i p t 
page c i t e d i n d i c a t e s the e n t i r e oppos i t e conclus ion should be 
a r r i v e d a t . 
This i s not a s i t u a t i o n where the Trooper was not ab le 
to t e s t i f y about d e f e n d a n t ' s d r iv ing p a t t e r n because he had not 
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observed it as in Noon (supra) but a situation where the Trooper, 
in fact, was strategically placed so as to carefully and clearly 
observe the driving pattern of the defendant for several Ogden 
City blocks, found nothing objectionable about it, and in fact, 
testified that there was nothing about the observed driving of 
defendant that would indicate to a trained observer that the 
driver was under the influence of alcohol and he stopped the 
defendant's vehicle only a "courtesy", (transcript, 31) 
So that there shall be no misstatement nor 
misunderstanding of the actual testimony of Trooper Ball, it is 
recited verbatim as follows: (transcript 31, 32) 
Q And as a courtesy you stopped him to tell him that 
his door was open, because apparently he didn't know that. 
A That's correct. 
Q As so there was nothing at all about this man's 
driving pattern that you would say, from your experience of 14 
years as a trooper, this man — there's something wrong with the 
man who is driving this vehicle and he might be intoxicated, 
there was nothing at all about that — 
A No. 
Q. Okay. so how long were you able to observe him 
driving his vehicle, what distance or so forth? 
A A block and a half. 
Q So you followed him for a block and a half. 
A I wasn't really following him, he was at a light 
ahead of me as I was at this light. He made the turn again and 
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then I just proceeded up there. 
Q You observed him a block ahead? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Okay. And nothing, from your observation, would 
indicate to you, as a trained Trooper, that this man may be under 
the influence of intoxicants while driving a vehicle? 
A That wasn't on my mind, no. 
Q All right, but that's what you are trained to 
observe though, as citizens go up and down the highway, isn't it? 
All right, so then — so you had no reason for pulling 
him over except for the doors are open and you want to see that 
they get closed? 
A That's correct. 
The Trooper not only clearly observed the driving 
pattern of the defendant a block and a half, at least, but 
candidly testified that there was nothing about the driving 
pattern of the defendant observed by the Trooper that would lead 
the Trooper to believe that the driver was intoxicated. 
CONCLUSION 
The arrest of the defendant was invalid and the 
evidence clearly showed that the defendant was not incapable of 
safely operating the motor vehicle. *$' 
Respectfully submitted this ,y;// day of November, 1988. 
GEORGE B. HANDY f ~^\ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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rity or variance which does not effect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disrega-
rded." State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 
(Utah 1984). See also State v. Anderson, 612 
P.2d 778, 786-8/ (Utah 1980)(error was 
rendered harmless by the independent testi-
mony of the other witnesses at the hearing). 
As in Anderson, we find that the trial 
court's error in admitting the receipt, was 
rendered harmless by the independent testi-
mony of both Brailsford and Ivie. In order to 
reach this conclusion, we must find that Bra-
ilsford and Ivie's testimony regarding the 
value of the stolen wire arose "from an inde-
pendent motivation by the witness[es] to make 
the disclosure." State v. Romero, 624 P.2d 
699,702 (Utah 1981). 
The facts of this case support such a 
finding. Motivated to testify by a plea 
bargain, both Brailsford and Ivie testified that 
they sold the stolen wire to Wasatch for $844, 
thus independently verifying the value of the 
sale. Moreover, despite a sustained motion to 
suppress his confession, defendant talked 
freely about the sale of the copper wire at 
trial. The value evidenced by the receipt was 
duplicative and therefore, the admission of the 
receipt was harmless error. 
VALUE OF THE STOLEN WIRE 
Defendant's final claim of error is that 
there was insufficient evidence that the value 
of the copper wire at the time and place of the 
theft exceeded $250. 
Our supreme court has held that in order to 
determine the value of stolen property for the 
purpose of determining the degree of the 
offense, market value is the appropriate test. 
State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah 
1977). The fair market value is measured at 
the time and place where the alleged crime was 
committed. Id. "Market value has been further 
clarified as being a measure of what the owner 
could expect to receive, and the amount a 
willing buyer would pay to the true owner for 
the stolen item." Id. (citations omitted). 
Defendant claims that the wire was impro-
perly valued for two reasons. First, defendant 
argues that the value of the copper wire was 
greatly increased when its insulation was 
burned off and the wire was transported from 
Millard County to Salt Lake City. Defendant 
claims that labor enhanced the value of the 
property after it was stolen. Second, defendant 
claims that although the wire sold for $844 at 
Wasatch, in Salt Lake City, the same wire, 
would sell for less than $600 in Millard 
County. We find defendant's arguments 
unpersuasive. 
The expert testimony of Mr. Holman, a 
dealer in scrap metal, stated that insulated 
wire of the same quantity and quality would 
sell in Salt Lake City for around 30 per 
pound, or approximately $633. Therefore, 
even assuming that we adopted defendant's 
CODE •Co 
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argument, and valued the wire in its insulated 
form, the evidence establishes that the value 
exceeds the $250 statutory requirement. 
Further, the expert testimony indicated Salt 
Lake City was the closest market. Conseque-
ntly, the trial judge correctly interpreted "at 
the time and place of the offense" to mean a 
time reasonably near the date of the theft and 
at the nearest market, i.e. Salt Lake City. In 
sum, we affirm the trial court's valuation of 
the stolen copper wire at more than $250. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Cite as 
94 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 
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Defendant appeals from a conviction of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
and seeks reversal of the denial of his motion 
to suppress and reversal of his conviction. 
FACTS 
On February 9, 1987, Paul Mangelson, a 
sergeant with the Utah Highway Patrol, was 
parked in the Interstate 15 median beneath an 
overpass near Mona, Juab County. He was 
checking the speed of cars with a radar unit 
and observing inspection stickers and registr-
ations. 
At approximately 3:45 p.m., Mangelson 
observed a "nice looking," late model Cadillac 
approaching at 56 mph. The car had Arizona 
license plates front and rear, however the 
I 
v. Ott 
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sucker on the rear license plate "didn't appear 
to be valid " He later testified, "something 
just struck me funny about it " Mangelson 
was unaware of Arizona's color scheme for 
determining sticker validity In spite of that, 
he followed the car for about a mile and det-
ermined the sticker was valid through Dece-
mber but was unable to determine if the per-
tinent year was 1986 or 1987. He stopped the 
car to determine the sticker's validity 
After making the stop and while approac-
hing the car, Mangelson saw the numbers 87 
m the lower right corner indicating the sticker 
was valid. He also observed new tires and new 
air shocks on the car. Closer inspection reve-
aled a jack and a lug wrench on the rear floor 
and a locking gas cap, which "appeared to be 
twisted off," on the back seat. Two keys were 
on the ignition key ring but there appeared to 
be no gas cap key. 
Upon request, defendant produced a Utah 
driver's license and an Arizona registration. 
When asked about the individual in whose 
name the Cadillac was registered, defendant 
stated she was a woman he had "met in 
Phoenix over the weekend" and that he had 
borrowed the car after his had been wrecked 
in Arizona. Defendant was not certain about 
the owner's address, her telephone number, or 
where his own wrecked car was located. 
During the time he was speaking with defen-
dant, Mangelson noticed the odor of marij-
uana. Defendant refused permission to search 
the car. 
Mangelson returned to his patrol car and 
radioed a request for computer checks. Those 
checks revealed that the Cadillac had not been 
reported stolen, but they did reveal that def-
endant's drivers license had been suspended. 
Defendant was arrested and the car towed to 
Nephi. Mangelson, without the consent of 
defendant, took the car keys, and with the 
County Sheriff and the County Attorney, 
conducted an inventory search of the car. The 
locked trunk was opened and 165 lbs of mar-
ijuana found therein. 
A hearing on defendant's motion to supp-
ress the evidence was held, following which 
the motion was demed. A bench trial was held 
on May 20, 1987. Defendant was found guilty. 
This appeal followed. 
ISSUES 
Two issues are presented on appeal. First, 
was there reasonable, articulable suspicion to 
justify an investigative stop of defendant's 
car7 Second, did the warrantless inventory 
search of defendant's car violate his right 
against unreasonable searches9 
INVESTIGATIVE STOP 
There are three levels of police-citizen 
encounters requinng different degrees of jus-
tification to be constitutionally permissible 
The Utah Supreme Court has listed these as 
UTAH 
(1) (A]n officer may approach a 
citizen at anytime [sic) and pose 
questions so long as the citizen is 
not detained against his will, (2) an 
officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspi-
cion" that the person has committed 
or is about to commit a crime; 
however, the "detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than 
is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop;" (3) an officer 
may arrest a suspect if the officer 
has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is 
being committed. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P 2d 616, 617-18 
(Utah 1987) (quoting United States v Memtt, 
736 F 2d 223, 230 (5th Cir 1984)) (citation 
omitted). 
Any time a police officer stops an automo-
bile the stop necessarily involves detention and 
therefore is a level two encounter requiring 
reasonable, articulable suspicion, Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, (1979), United States v. 
Bngnoni-Poncc, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975). 
Absent reasonable suspicion, evidence denved 
from the stop is "fruit of the poisonous tree," 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 
(1963), Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 
338, 341 (1939), and must be excluded. Katz v. 
United States, 399 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Wolf 
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,28 (1949). 
Since reasonable suspicion depends on the 
"totality of the circumstances," State v. Sierra, 
754 P.2d 972, 977 (Utah App. 1988)(citmg 
Brignoni-Poncc, 442 U.S. at 885 n.10), a 
bright line delineating what is or is not reas-
onable cannot be drawn. Guidance can be 
found, however, in a review of cases. The 
"reasonable suspicion" standard has been 
applied in Utah courts in State v. Mendoza, 
748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987) (Mexican appear-
ance, California plates, route, time, "erratic" 
driving with police car tailing two to six feet 
behind, and nervous behavior after stop ins-
ufficient for reasonable suspicion); State v. 
Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987) 
(officer had reasonable suspicion to stop auto 
because officer knew of revoked license and 
outstanding arrest warrant), State v. Carpena, 
714 P.2d 675 (Utah 1986) (officer lacked rea-
sonable suspicion to stop auto with out-of-
state plates moving slowly at 3 00 a.m. 
through neighborhood where rash of burgla-
ries had recently occurred), and State v. 
Swamgan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985) 
(description of two men seen in area by 
another officer two hours previously insuffi-
cient to give officer reasonable suspicion to 
stop two men walking at 1*40 am. three 
blocks from burglary), see also State v Truj-
Ulo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App 1987). This court 
REPORTS 
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ecently found in Sierra, that an officer did 
lot have reasonable suspicion to stop Sierra 
aased solely on New York plates, Sierra's 
"suspicious nature and the way {Sierra) reacted 
when he [saw] me." Instead the stop was just 
a pretext to discover evidence of illegal activity 
to support his "hunch." 754 P.2d 972. 
In the instant case the officer articulated 
"something just struck me funny about it" 
referring to the license plate sticker. Alone this 
does not approach reasonable and articulable 
suspicion.1 The State attempted to justify the 
stop by the after-discovered evidence of new 
tires and shocks, a twisted-off gas cap, the 
jack in the back seat, the defendant's confu-
sion about ownership of the car, and the smell 
of marijuana. While this may have justified a 
further inquiry of the driver after a valid stop, 
such articulable .suspicion mus\ be.Dresent^at 
tnTtime of^the ston anjLmust be the reason 
^^J^«ogrTn*13iis caseT no reasonable' or 
articulalJfesuspicion existed to justify the stop. 
The evidence used to convict defendant was 
derived by exploitation of the impermissible 
stop. None of the exceptions to the exclusio-
nary rule apply;2 the evidence should have 
been suppressed. 
INVENTORY SEARCH 
Since this case must be reversed on the 
grounds previously stated, we do not reach 
defendant's second claim of error, that the 
warrantless inventory search violated his right 
against unreasonable searches. 
Defendant's conviction is reversed. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. If this is sufficient reason to stop, every out-of-
state vehicle may be stopped for no reason other 
than the officer's ignorance of the license plate 
sticker color code. 
2. Stivcrthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 
U.S. 385 (1920) (independent source); Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (exigencies); Nar-
done v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) 
(attenuation); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 
160, 164 (1949) (probable cause search); Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1969) (weapon frisk); Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (incident to arrest); 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) 
(inventory); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 557 (1980) (consent); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 
730 (1983) (plain view); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 
431 (1984) (inevitable discovery); United States v. 
Brignoni-Poncc, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) 
(reasonable suspicion seizure); see also Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 n.19 (1967); Vale 
v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30. 35 (1970). 
Cue as 
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OPINION 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's 
order dismissing respondent from liability 
under a blanket indemnity agreement. We 
affirm. 
In September 1973, defendant Keith R. 
Nelson was doing business as AAA Electric 
Service (AAA). At that time Keith was 
married to defendant and respondent Maureen 
Nelson. Keith was involved in work for the 
United States Government and was required to 
obtain surety bonds for his contracts. In order 
to do this, Keith and Maureen executed a 
"Blanket Indemnity Agreement" with plaintiff 
and appellant American Bonding Company 
(American) on September 17, 1973. Keith, 
doing business as AAA, was listed as principal 
while both Keith and Maureen were identified 
as indemnitors. Based upon the agreement, 
American issued performance bonds for 
Keith's contract jobs. 
Germane to this appeal are the following 
paragraphs of the indemnity agreement: 
ELEVENTH: The Indemnitors 
hereby waive notice of the execution 
of said Bonds and of the acceptance 
LAYTON CITY 
Cite u 741 P.2J 965 
Defendant's menacing gesture accompa-
nied by verbal threats is not sufficient evi-
dence alone to establish the use of a fire-
arm or a facsimile of a firearm. To hold 
otherwise would pervert the language of 
section 76-6-302 and erode the statutory 
distinction between robbery and aggrava-
ted robbery. We find a recent decision of 
the Supreme Court of Kentucky to be per-
suasive. In a case with facts very similar 
to the present case, the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky supported the defendant's con-
viction of first degree robbery by assert-
ing: "It is not fatal that appellant threat-
ened with an unseen weapon or instru-
ment The culpability of the defend-
ant's intent is manifested by his threat of 
physical harm and danger to the victim 
exists from the response to fear he per-
ceives as reasonable." Williams v. Com-
monwealth, 721 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Ky.1986). 
Reversing the conviction, the Court re-
sponded: 
This, however, does not distinguish it 
from second degree robbery in which the 
threat of physical force is the gravamen. 
A response of perceiving danger is quite 
real under threat; however, such cannot 
serve to convert something merely spec-
ulated upon (a weapon or instrument) 
into established existence Without 
an instrument's ever being seen, an in-
timidating threat albeit coupled with a 
menacing gesture cannot suffice to meet 
the standard necessary for a first-degree 
robbery conviction Without some-
thing tangible backing up the threat, 
words do not reach beyond the status of 
threats and as such are insufficient to 
sustain submission under first-degree 
robbery. 
WiMaTtis, 721 S.W.2d at 712, 713. 
[3] Force and fear are elements of rob-
bery as defined in section 76-6-301. They 
are clearly established by the evidence in 
this case. To sustain a conviction under 
section 76-6-302, however, a firearm or a 
facsimile thereof must be used by the de-
fendant. We must observe this critical dis-
tinction between robbery and aggravated 
robbery where the evidence is only of ver-





[41 Finally, defendant argues that the 
trial court abused its discretion by refusing 
to give a requested cautionary eyewitness 
instruction as required by this Court in 
State v. Long, 111 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). 
We find no error. Our decision in Long 
directed that "in cases tried from this day 
forward, trial courts shall give such an 
instruction whenever eyewitness identifica-
tion is a central issue in a case and such an 
instruction is requested by the defense." 
Long, 721 P.2d at 492. Because the case at 
bar was tried, and a verdict reached, before 
our decision in Long was filed, the trial 
court was not bound by Long. 
Even absent the requirement of Long, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by refusing the requested instruction. The 
State presented corroborating testimony 
from several eyewitnesses regarding the 
identity of defendant In turn, defense 
counsel's closing argument sufficiently 
alerted the jury to the possibility of error 
in eyewitness identification. 
Defendant's conviction of aggravated 
robbery under section 76-6-302 is vacated. 
The conviction is reduced to robbery, a 
felony of the second degree under section 
76-6-301, and the case is remanded to the 
trial court for defendant to be resentenced. 
HALL, CJ., STEWART, Associate 
C.J., and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, 
JJ., concur. 
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LAYTON CITY, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
James BENNETT, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 870038-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 31, 1987. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fourth 
Circuit Court, Layton Department, of driv-
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mg while under the influence of alcohol 
and he appealed. The Court of Appeals 
held that: (1) initial encounter between of-
ficer and defendant was not a "seizure," 
subject to Fourth Amendment protection; 
(2) defendant was not entitled to excusal 
for cause of potential jurors who were 
MADD associate and reserve police officer; 
and (3) statutory hearsay exception for in-
toxilyzer testing affidavit was not repealed 
by adoption of rules of evidence. 
Affirmed. 
1. Automobiles <s=»349 
Initial encounter between motorist and 
police officer was a consensual and volun-
tary discussion and not a "seizure" subject 
to Fourth Amendment protection, with re-
gard to prosecution of motorist for driving 
while under the influence of alcohol, where 
officer followed motorist's vehicle into con-
struction site, defendant parked and exited 
his vehicle without any request to do so by 
officer and walked up to police car and 
freely initiated conversation. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
2. Automobiles e=*349 
Police officer had "reasonable suspi-
cion" to detain defendant on suspicion of 
driving while intoxicated and to request 
submission to field sobriety tests, for pur-
poses of defendant's Fourth Amendment 
challenge to his "interrogation," in prose-
cution for driving under the influence of 
alcohol, where officer observed defendant's 
voluntary approach upon his exit from 
truck, and detected strong odor of alcohol. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
3. Jury <3=>83(3), 105(2) 
Defendant failed to demonstrate that 
potential jurors could not act in fair and 
impartial manner in prosecution for driving 
while under the influence of alcohol, and 
was not entitled to excusal of those jurors 
for cause, where the prospective jurors, an 
associate of Mothers Against Drunk Driv-
ers and reserve police officer in adjoining 
city, assured trial judge after detailed ques-
tioning that their respective associations 
would be no impediment to proper fulfill-
ment of their juror's duty. 
4. Courts <S=85( 1) 
Adoption of rules of evidence did not 
automatically repeal other statutory hear-
say exceptions. Rules of Evid., Rule 802. 
5. Courts <3=>85(1) 
Criminal Law e=>419(12) 
Creation of additional exception to 
hearsay rule by statutory provision autho-
rizing admission of intoxilyzer testing affi-
davits was supplemental to hearsay excep-
tions contained in rules of evidence, and 
exception for the affidavit was neither in-
consistent with nor impliedly repealed by 
adoption of rules of evidence. U.C.A.1953, 
41-6-44.3; Rules of Evid., Rule 802. 
6. Affidavits <®=18 
Intoxilyzer testing affidavits contained 
sufficient foundation to be admissible in 
prosecution for driving while under the in-
fluence of alcohol, where facts stated in 
affidavits were based upon affiant's per-
sonal knowledge and observations, rather 
than upon someone else's hearsay informa-
tion. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.3. 
7. Affidavits <3=*18 
Intoxilyzer testing affidavits created 
only rebuttable presumption that testing 
was properly performed, but defendant 
failed to rebut that presumption, in prose-
cution for driving while under the influence 
of alcohol, where he did not impeach accu-
racy or completeness of testing procedures 
or affidavits. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.3. 
Steven Garside, Layton City Prosecutor, 
Layton, for plaintiff and respondent. 
Scott R. Wangsgard, Conder & Wangs-
gard, West Valley City, for defendant and 
appellant. 




Defendant James A. Bennett appeals his 
conviction in circuit court for driving while 
under the influence of alcohol. On appeal, 
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defendant argues that (1) the arresting of-
ficer violated defendant's fourth amend-
ment rights by "interrogating" him with-
out any "reasonable suspicion;" (2) the tri-
al court should have dismissed two poten-
tial jurors for cause; and (3) the trial court 
improperly admitted "intoxilyzer mainte-
nance affidavits." We reject these claims 
and affirm defendant's conviction. 
[1] A complete statement of facts is 
unnecessary. Briefly stated, a police offi-
cer observed defendant driving his truck 
into a construction site at 1:00 a.m. and 
followed in behind him. Defendant parked 
his truck at the site and exited his vehicle 
without any request to do so by the officer. 
Defendant walked up to the police car as 
the officer was getting out and freely initi-
ated a conversation. This initial encounter 
was a consensual and voluntary discussion 
between the defendant and the officer. It 
was not a seizure subject to fourth amend-
ment protection. Defendant's constitution-
al right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures was therefore not 
violated at this stage. Florida v. Rodri-
guez, 469 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 
165 (1986); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 
103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); 
State v. Dietman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 
1987). See also, State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 
85 (App.1987). There was also no violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982). 
[2] It was not until after the defend-
ant's voluntary approach that the officer 
observed him and detected a strong odor of 
alcohol. Defendant was then detained on 
suspicion of driving while intoxicated and 
was requested to submit to field sobriety 
tests. The officer had the necessary "rea-
sonable suspicion" to detain defendant at 
this point. 
[3] Second, defendant argues that two 
potential jurors should have been excused 
from the panel venire for cause. He erro-
neously focuses attention only upon selec-
tive statements in the jury voir dire, ignor-
ing substantial assurances to the trial court 
that, as jurors, the individuals would be 
fair, impartial and objective to both sides 
and follow the court's instructions. De-
v. BENNETT Utah 967 
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fendant criticizes the first proposed juror's 
association with MADD (Mothers Against 
Drunk Drivers) and the other's position as 
a reserve police officer in an adjoining city. 
In specific, detailed questioning by the 
court, each assured the trial judge that 
their respective associations would be no 
impediment to proper fulfillment of a ju-
ror's duty. After our review of the entire 
record, we find no abuse of the trial court's 
discretion in refusing to excuse either juror 
for cause. State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22 
(Utah 1984); State v. Lacey, 665 P 2d 1311 
(Utah 1983); State v. Van Dam, 554 P.2d 
1324 (Utah 1976). Defendant did not dem-
onstrate on the trial record, or on appeal, 
that either could not act in a fair and 
impartial manner, State v. Brooks, 631 
P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981), or that "strong 
and deep impressions" against the defend-
ant's case had formed. State v. Hewitt, at 
26. 
Defendant maintains that the intoxilyzer 
testing affidavits (Exhibits A, B, and C) 
were inadmissible hearsay. He claims that 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 (1986) is incon-
sistent with and was impliedly repealed by 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. He then ar-
gues that the affidavits would not be ad-
missible under any exception to the hear-
say rule, Utah R.Evid. 802. 
[4] We reject the argument that the 
adoption of the evidence rules on admissi-
ble hearsay automatically repealed other 
statutory hearsay exceptions. Utah 
R.Evid. 802, provides that: "hearsay is not 
admissible except as provided by law or by 
these rules" (emphasis added). Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44.3 was enacted as a statu-
tory exception to the hearsay rule and its 
validity was affirmed in Murray v. Hall, 
663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983). Rule 802 clear-
ly contemplates that other statutory provi-
sions may similarly apply as valid excep-
tions to otherwise inadmissible hearsay. 
See e.g., State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353 
(Utah 1986) and State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 
1208 (1987). 
[5] Moreover, pursuant to its constitu-
tional power in article VIII, § 4, of the 
Utah Constitution, in September 1985, the 
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Supreme Court formally adopted all statu-
tory rules of evidence not inconsistent with 
the Court's rules. The creation of an addi-
tional exception to the hearsay rule by 
§ 41-6-44..] is supplemental to and not in-
consistent with Rule 802. Cf. State v. Bar-
neycastle, 699 P.2d 745, 746 (Utah 1985). 
[6] Finally, defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the intoxilyzer testing affida-
vits, asserting they are not sufficiently de-
tailed to satisfy the requirements of Mur-
ray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d at 1321-2. In 
Hall, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
only affidavits contemporaneously pre-
pared in the normal course of duty, with 
indications of trustworthiness, are admissi-
ble under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 
(1986). In this case the facts stated are 
based upon the affiant's personal knowl-
edge and observation as the person who 
conducted the machine testing procedures, 
and not upon someone else's hearsay infor-
mation as in Hall Id. at 1320, n. 5. The 
affidavits contain sufficient foundation to 
be admissible. 
[7] The remainder of the alleged flaws 
in the affidavits relate only to the weight 
given them by the trier of fact—not to 
their admissibility. The affidavits create 
only a rebuttable presumption that the test-
ing was properly performed. As stated in 
Hall, if the defendant desired to impeach 
the accuracy or the completeness of the 
testing procedures or the affidavits, he 
could have subpoenaed the officer respon-
sible for the testing or secured other de-
monstrative evidence. Id. at 1321-2. But, 
as in Hallt defendant did not do so. 
Defendant's conviction is affirmed. 
BENCH, BILLINGS and DAVIDSON, 
JJ., concur. 
fo | KEY NUMBCI SYSTEM> 
Ricky C. BEARD and Lynda K. Beard, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Kenneth DUGDALE and Lena Mae 
Dugdale, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 860101-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 25, 1987. 
Executors of trust deed obtained tem-
porary restraining order enjoining trustee's 
sale. The Salt Lake County District dis-
solved injunction and granted respondents' 
motion for summary judgment. The execu-
tors appealed. The Court of Appeals, Jack-
son, J., held that: (1) evidence of fair rental 
value was sufficient for purposes of deter-
mining respondents' award for wrongfully 
issued injunction, and (2) respondents' at-
torney fees should have been limited to 
hours spent by counsel as a result of 
wrongfully issued injunction. 
Judgment, as modified, affirmed. 
1. Injunction <3=3150 
Mortgages <e=>338 
Evidence of rental value was suffi-
cient, for purposes of determining award of 
lost rent due to wrongful temporary re-
straining order enjoining sale under trust 
deed. 
2. Injunction <5»150, 252(6) 
Award of attorney fees to those who 
were successful in having temporary re-
straining order enjoining trustee's sale dis-
solved should have been limited only to 
hours spent by counsel as a result of 
wrongfully issued temporary restraining 
order. 
Don Blackham, Blackham & Boley, West 
Valley City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
James T. Dunn, Mortensen & Neider, 
Salt Lake City, for defendants and respon-
dents. 
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rights, regardless of how egregious or 
longstanding the particular pattern of 
abuse might be, still the trial court's order 
in this case would have to be affirmed. In 
this case, the trial court found that Vargas 
refused to acknowledge past deficiencies 
and expressed no desire to improve as a 
parent and to correct the abuses and ne-
glect that were overwhelmingly evidenced 
by testimony at trial. This is tantamount 
to a finding that any efforts at rehabilita-
tion in this case would have been altogeth-
er ineffectual. In no case would rehabilita-
tive efforts be required where they would 
clearly be futile or where they would need-
lessly expose a child to a clear risk of 
further abuse. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
[5] The statute allows parental rights 
to be terminated if, inter alia, the parent is 
"unfit or incompetent by reason of conduct 
or condition which is seriously detrimental 
to the child" or if the parent has abandoned 
the child. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-
48(l)(a), (b) (1986). The State must prove 
the parent's unfitness or abandonment by 
clear and convincing evidence. E.g., San-
tosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-69, 102 
S.Ct 1388, 1402-03, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); 
In Interest of A.H., 716 P.2d 284, 287 
(Utah 1986); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1377 
(Utah 1982); Rule 21, Utah State Juvenile 
Court Rules of Practice & Procedure. 
[6] We have reviewed the extensive and 
thorough record and agree with the trial 
court that the petitioners proved by clear 
and convincing evidence that Vargas was 
unfit to the extent required by the statute. 
Although the father offered contrary testi-
mony, both his own and that of witnesses 
he called, the trial court's ruling against 
him is amply supported. Testimony clearly 
and convincingly showed that the child was 
subjected to a pattern of extreme physical 
abuse, including being kicked, being re-
peatedly backhanded, having his hair 
pulled, and being thrown against a wall. 
In addition, the evidence showed that on 
numerous occasions Vargas permitted his 
four year old child to consume alcoholic 
beverages to the point of inebriation. Var-
gas also gave the young child marijuana, to 
"prove his manhood," and instructed him 
on methods for usage of the substance. 
The father failed to provide adequate win-
ter clothing for the child and kept him in 
uninhabitable surroundings, characterized 
as including filth, vomit, dog feces, and 
spoiled and decaying foods. Vargas often 
belittled the child, accusing him of being a 
"queer" when the child tried to show affec-
tion to his father or to others. At one 
time, shortly after the child had been bitten 
by the dog and was gravely ill, requiring 
surgery and special care, Vargas ordered 
the petitioners, who were then caring for 
the child, to return the child to his girl-
friend's household, saying: ' i f he dies, he 
dies. I make more babies." 
Appellant's parental rights were validly 
terminated. The judgment of the trial 
court is affirmed. 
DAVIDSON and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
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LAYTON CITY, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Billy E. NOON, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 860248-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 4, 1987. 
Defendant was convicted of driving 
while under the influence of alcohol by a 
Circuit Court jury. Verdict was upheld on 
appeal to the Second District Court. De-
fendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Jackson, J., held that: (1) officer reason-
ably believed that defendant committed of-
fense of driving under the influence of 
alcohol even though officer had not seen 
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defendant actually driving car, and (2) trial 
counsel was not ineffective. 
Affirmed. 
1. Automobiles <$=>349 
Police officer, who saw only one ve-
hicle in parking lot of store to which he had 
gone in response to dispatcher's coded mes-
sage that intoxicated person was about to 
become intoxicated driver, who verified 
with store clerk that defendant was the 
person in question and had driven vehicle 
into lot, and who heard defendant's slurred 
speech, watched defendant walk from store 
in unsteady manner, and smelled alcohol on 
defendant's breath, had probable cause to 
arrest defendant for driving under influ-
ence of alcohol, even though officer had 
not actually seen defendant arrive in car. 
U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44(8). 
2. Criminal Law <s=*641.13(6) 
Defendant's trial counsel was not inef-
fective for failing to object to five arguably 
leading questions which did not concern 
crux of defendant's testimony or suggest 
answer that could not have been elicited by 
proper questioning. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 6. 
3. Criminal Law <s=>641.13(6) 
Defense counsel was not ineffective 
for failing to object sooner to prevent wit-
ness' first irrelevant comment about de-
fendant possibly killing someone because 
of perceived intoxication. 
4. Criminal Law <s=>419(3) 
Officer's testimony about what store 
clerk told him in store before officer ap-
proached defendant was not hearsay be-
cause it was not offered to prove truth of 
matter asserted by officer, but was offered 
to explain what information officer had 
that led him to believe that defendant had 
been driving while intoxicated. Rules of 
Evid., Rule 801(c). 
5. Criminal Law <s=>641.13(6) 
Defense counsel was not ineffective 
for failing to object to lack of foundation 
for officer to read from DUI form; even 
though foundation was necessary to show 
officer's need to refresh his recollection, 
prosecutor could easily have laid such foun-
dation. Rules of Evid., Rule 612; U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 6. 
6. Criminal Law <3=>448<11, 16) 
Police officer's testimony that defend-
ant repeatedly declined offer to take breath 
test did not constitute opinion or legal con-
clusion. Rules of Evid., Rules 701, 702; 
U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10(8). 
7. Criminal Law <3=>641.13(1) 
Although criminal defendant is consti-
tutionally entitled to defense counsel with 
reasonably competent levels of skill, judg-
ment and diligence, Court of Appeals* will 
not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate 
use of judgment. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 
6. 
J. Franklin Allred, Margo L. James, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellant 
Steve Garside, Layton City Atty., Lay-
ton, for plaintiff and respondent. 




A circuit court jury convicted defendant 
Billy E. Noon of driving while under the 
influence of alcohol ("DUI"), a violation of 
Layton Municipal Code § 41-6-44. The 
verdict was upheld on appeal to the Second 
District Court. Noon appeals to this Court, 
claiming that the police had no probable 
cause to arrest him for DUI and that he 
was denied effective assistance of counsel 
at trial. We affirm the conviction. 
On the evening of November 30, 1985, 
Noon drove into a Circle K fast enough to 
catch the attention of the lone store clerk, 
Wilhelm. Wilhelm watched Noon park the 
car, get out and enter the store. According 
to Wilhelm, Noon stumbled, his speech was 
slurred when they talked about the open 
trunk on his car, and he smelled of alcohol. 
Wilhelm told Noon he had left his head-
lights on. When Noon returned to the car 
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to turn off his lights, Wilhelm called the 
police. 
A few minutes later, Officers Robnett 
and Cline reached the store parking lot in 
response to the dispatcher's coded message 
that an intoxicated person was about to 
become an intoxicated driver. There was 
only one car there, an empty 1964 light 
blue Ford Falcon. The officers saw no one 
in the well lit parking lot. Robnett went 
into the store and up to Wilhelm, who was 
standing behind the counter. Wilhelm told 
Robnett that Noon, the only customer in 
the store at that time, was the one who had 
prompted Wilhelm's call to the ^ulice, that 
he drove up In the car in the lot, and that 
there was no one else in the vehicle. 
Robnett then approached Noon, who 
smelled heavily of alcohol. To assure him-
self that the smell was coming from Noon's 
breath, and not just from Noon's clothing 
or person, Robnett had Noon blow into the 
officer's hand. Robnett believed Noon was 
intoxicated; he staggered and slurred his 
speech. Robnett asked Noon to step out-
side the store in order to take field sobriety 
tests. Noon complied with this request, 
but could not complete an accurate recita-
tion of the alphabet, A through Z. At 
Robnett's request, Noon attempted to 
stand with both legs together and then 
raise either foot six inches off the ground 
and hold it there. Noon fell backward al-
most as soon as he lifted his foot; the 
officer caught him in mid-fall. Noon then 
claimed that he could not be arrested for 
DUI because he had not been driving the 
car. A friend of his brother had been 
dnving, Noon said, but had "taken off" 
when the police pulled up. 
At the police station, Noon again insisted 
he hadn't been driving, but agreed to take 
a breath test. The intoxilyzer machine was 
cleared, as required by standard procedure, 
and the officer removed a mouthpiece from 
a sealed bag, hooked it to the tube from the 
intoxilyzer, and put it up to Noon's mouth 
for him to blow into. Noon stuck the 
mouthpiece in his mouth, but tried to ex-
vale Lrfcu.vi *J mouthpiece ^o that no air 
entered the tube This was obvious to 
Officer Robnett because air in the tube 
normally makes a sound and a light on the 
intoxilyzer illuminates when sufficient air 
is entering the tube to constitute a good 
sample. Robnett warned Noon that the air 
was not going into the tube, preventing a 
proper sample. At that point, Noon told 
Robnett he would not continue with the 
breath test process without a lawyer 
present. Despite repeated warnings from 
Robnett that refusal could lead to license 
revocation, Noon continued to decline the 
breath test. The testing process was halt-
ed, and Noon wras booked into jail. 
Noon's first contention on appeal is that 
Officer Robnett did not have probable 
cause to arrest him for driving under the 
influence of alcohol. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44 (1986), which is identical to Lay-
ton Municipal Code § 41-6-44, provides, in 
pertinent parts: 
(1) It is unlawful and punishable as pro-
vided in this section for any person with 
a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater 
by weight, or who is under the influence 
of alcohol or any drug or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree which renders the person incapa-
ble of safely driving a vehicle, to drive or 
be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state 
(8) A peace officer may, without a war-
rant, arrest a person for a violation of 
this section when the officer has proba-
ble cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, 
and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed 
by the person. 
[1] In determining whether Officer 
Robnett had probable cause to arrest Noon 
for driving under the influence of alcohol, 
we must ask 
whether from the facts known to the 
officer, and the inferences which fairly 
might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable 
and prudent person in his position would 
be justified in believing that the suspect 
had committed the offense. 
Stih v. Hutcht r, 27 Utah 2d 31*. 495 P.2d 
1259. 1260 (1972) (footnote omitted). See 
State e. Whittcnback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 
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(Utah 1980). Applying this standard to 
Officer Robnett's knowledge at the time of 
Noon's arrest, we are convinced that Rob-
nett reasonably believed Noon had commit-
ted the offense of driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol. 
Robnett testified that he saw only one 
vehicle in the store parking lot as he and 
Officer Cline approached and that he saw 
no other person in the area of the lot or in 
the store who might have been the fleeing 
phantom driver proposed by Noon. Rob-
nett verified with the store clerk that 
Noon, the only person in the store at that 
time besides the officers and the store 
clerk, was the person about whom the clerk 
had called the police and that Noon was the 
one who had driven up in the car parked 
outside. In addition, Robnett could smell 
alcohol on Noon's breath. He heard 
Noon's slurred speech and watched Noon 
walk from the store in an unsteady man-
ner. He heard Noon repeat several letters 
as he said the alphabet, and he caught 
Noon before he fell to the ground while 
attempting the other field sobriety test. 
The mere fact that Robnett had not seen 
Noon actually driving the car is not fatal to 
the existence of probable cause, since Sec-
tion 41-6-44(8) specifically provides that 
the violation need not occur in the presence 
of the officer. Given what Robnett knew, 
he reasonably believed: (1) that Noon was 
under the influence of alcohol to a degree 
that rendered him incapable of driving a 
vehicle, and (2) that Noon had been intoxi-
cated while driving the parked vehicle. 
Noon's second contention on appeal is 
that he was denied a fair trial, as guaran-
teed by the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments to the United States Constitution 
and by article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, because of the ineffective as-
sistance of trial counsel. Noon claims prej-
udice from trial counsel's failure to object 
to: (1) the prosecutor's leading questions 
during direct examination of Wilhelm; (2) 
Wilhelm's explanation of why he called the 
police to report Noon; (3) Officer Robnett's 
testimony of what Wilhelm said to Robnett 
before Robnett approached Noon in the 
store; (4) Robnett's reading from his report 
form about what transpired at the police 
station during the aborted intoxilyzer test; 
and (5) Robnett's testimony that Noon re-
fused to submit to the breath test. 
In order to challenge a conviction on the 
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
it is the defendant's burden to show: (1) 
that his counsel rendered a deficient per-
formance in some demonstrable manner, 
and (2) that the outcome of the trial 
would probably have been different but 
for counsel's error. 
State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 
1985) (citations omitted). We examine each 
of the claimed errors by trial counsel to see 
if they demonstrate a deficient perform-
ance under the first part of the Geary test. 
[2] Noon first claims to have been prej-
udiced by the failure of trial counsel to 
object to leading questions the prosecutor 
asked Wilhelm. A reading of the trial tran-
script shows that there were five questions 
in the eleven pages cited to us by appel-
lant's brief that might be considered lead-
ing, but they do not concern the crux of 
Wilhelm's testimony. Nor did the ques-
tions suggest an answer that could not 
have been elicited by proper questioning. 
Indeed, one of the portions of the tran-
script Noon directed us to consists of sever-
al pages of defense counsel's repeated ob-
jections to the prosecutor's questions to 
Wilhelm about whether Noon acted differ-
ently during the field sobriety tests than he 
had while in the store. Defense counsel 
succeeded in getting the prosecutor to 
withdraw the questions. 
[3] Noon next contends that counsel 
should have objected to Wilhelm's narra-
tive about why he called the police. He 
claims the narrative was irrelevant and 
prejudicial. That "narrative" consists of 
one sentence that was not responsive to the 
prosecutor's question: 
Q. Okay. Now, before he went out to 
shut his trunk and turn out his lights, did 
you ask him any questions about the 
vehicle or about himself or— 
A. Well, at first I wasn't going to call 
the police and then I was concerned for 
his safety and the safety of people—he 
might kill a family or something. 1 
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asked him if that was his car and he said, 
"Yeah." And, before he went out to—I 
told him his lights were on and his trunk 
was open when I asked him if that was 
his car. That's when he went out to shut 
his lights off and try to shut his trunk. 
Q. Okay, then. When he exited you 
called the police. 
A. Right. 
Q. And why did you do that? 
A. Well, you know, I didn't want it on 
my conscience that, you know, that he 
could have— 
At this point, defense counsel interrupted 
and objected to the question based on rele-
vancy. In other words, although not with 
lightning speed, he did exactly what Noon 
claims he failed to do. We cannot fault 
defense counsel for being unable to read 
Wilhelm's mind and prevent his first irrele-
vant comment about Noon possibly killing 
someone. 
[4] Third, Noon claims it was inadmissi-
ble hearsay for Robnett to testify about 
what Wilhelm told him in the store before 
the officer approached Noon. We dis-
agree. The testimony was not hearsay be-
cause it was not offered to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted by Wilhelm; rather, 
it was offered to explain wThat information 
Robnett had that led him to believe Noon 
had been driving while intoxicated. Utah 
R.Evid. 801(c). See State v. Collier, 736 
P.2d 231, 234 (Utah 1987). 
[5] Noon next argues that defense 
counsel should have objected to the lack of 
foundation for Robnett to read from a DUI 
form. The officer read several questions 
and admonitions printed on the form that 
he had read to Noon as he attempted to 
give him a breath test. He also read from 
the form the notations he had made, at the 
time, of Noon's response to each question 
or admonition. While it is true that a foun-
dation was necessary to show Robnett's 
need to refresh his recollection, Utah 
R.Evid. 612, the prosecutor could easily 
have laid such a foundation. Any objection 
by trial counsel would, therefore, have 
been useless and could have led the jury to 
think that defense counsel was unnecessar-
ily interrupting the officer. 
[6] The last alleged error is counsel's 
failure to object to Robnett's testimony 
about Noon's refusal to submit properly to 
a breath test. Robnett testified that he 
repeatedly warned Noon of the potential 
license revocation for failure to take the 
breath test, but that Noon repeatedly de-
clined the offer. Then the prosecutor 
asked: 
Q. So he refused to submit then to the 
breath test, I mean intoxilyzer? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Noon's appellate counsel argues that this 
constituted an opinion or legal conclusion 
for which no foundation was laid, as re-
quired by either Utah R.Evid. 701 or 702, 
and for which no foundation was possible. 
However, Officer Robnett never said, "In 
my opinion, Noon refused the test," or 
anything that would suggest he was stat-
ing an opinion. He did not "characterize" 
Noon's actions as being a refusal; he mere-
ly recited his observations of Noon's words 
and actions while he tried to administer the 
breath test. The jury was free to evaluate 
this testimony and reach its own conclu-
sions about the meaning of Noon's behav-
ior and statements that he would not con-
tinue without his lawyer present. This ad-
missible testimony from Robnett did not 
become an opinion simply through the pros-
ecutor's use of the words "refuse" or "re-
fusal," terms that are also used in the 
statute implying a driver's consent to be 
chemically tested for intoxication, Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1986). Moreover, 
that statute specifically makes admissible 
evidence of Noon's refusal to submit to the 
chemical test: 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to 
submit to a chemical test or tests under 
the provisions of this section, evidence of 
refusal shall be admissible in any civil or 
criminal action or proceeding arising out 
of acts alleged to have been committed 
while the person was driving or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol or any 
drug or combination of alcohol and any 
drug. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(8) (19S6). 
[7] We recognize that a criminal de-
fendant is constitutionally entitled to de-
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fense counsel with reasonably competent 
levels of skill, judgment and diligence 
Dyer v Crisp, 613 F2d 275, 278 (10th 
Cir 1980) (en banc), cert denied, 445 U S 
945, 100 S Ct 1342, 63 L Ed 2d 779 (1980) 
However, this court will not second-guess 
trial counsel's legitimate use of judgment 
Codianna i Moms, 660 P2d 1101, 1110 
(Utah 1983), State u McNicol, 554 P 2d 
203, 205 (Utah 1976) 
We are not convinced that these deci-
sions of Noon's tnal counsel demonstrate 
anything more than his permissible stylistic 
or strategic choices His tactics do not 
come close to showing deficient representa-
tion that might have resulted m a constitu-
tional depnvation Noon has, therefore, 
failed to establish the first requirement of 
the standard set out in Geary 
From our review of the record, we are 
satisfied that trial counsel provided a com-
petent defense, and that Noon had the fair 
tnal to which he was entitled 
The conviction is affirmed 
BILLINGS and GARFF, J J , concur 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
John SUAREZ, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 860191-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
May 4, 1987 
Defendant was convicted of three 
counts of forcible sexual abuse in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, David B 
Dee, J Defendant appealed The Court of 
Appeals, Davidson, J , held that (1) 
claimed conduct of victim which occurred 
after acts of which defendant was convict-
ed was irrelevant, for purpose of admission 
into evidence, (2) defendant's conduct in 
removing 12-year old victim's tube top and 
putting his mouth on her breasts constitut 
ed taking "indecent liberties" with victim, 
and (3) defendant's acts of first placing his 
mouth on victim's breasts, the taking of 
indecent liberties, and then placing his 
hand on her vagina, were separate acts 
requiring proof of different elements and 
constituted separate offenses 
Affirmed 
1. Rape <3=>40(1) 
Any evidence of alleged sexual abuse 
victim's sexual conduct, her use of illicit 
drugs, and her contracting of sexually 
transmitted disease, which claimed conduct 
occurred after alleged forcible sexual 
abuse, was irrelevant and was properly ex-
cluded 
2. Assault and Battery <3=>59 
Defendant's conduct in removing 12-
} ear old victim's tube top and putting his 
mouth on her breasts constituted taking 
"indecent liberties" with victim U C A 
1953, 76-5-404 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions 
3. Criminal Law <s=>29 
Defendant's acts of first placing his 
mouth on victim's breasts, the taking of 
indecent liberties, and then placing his 
hand on her vagina, were separate acts 
requiring proof of different elements and 
constituted separate offenses U C A1953, 
76-1-402(1), 76-5-404, U.S C.A. Const. 
Amend. 5 
4. Criminal Law <s=>469 
Testimony of expert witness opining 
that victim had been sexually abused, for 
which testimony foundation had been es-
tablished and appeared m record, was ad-
missible 
5. Criminal Law <s=>l 134(3) 
Whether trial court erred in allowing 
filing of new information on day of trial 
was irrelevant and would not be discussed 
